Definitions

Iterated Prisoners Dilemma

 

Description  Table of strategies 

 

Description  

 


Table of strategies  

 

Name Description R
Friendly Tit For Tat Starts by cooperation, repeats opponent's last choice N
Unfriendly Tit For Tat Starts by deception, repeats opponent's last choice N
Friendly Tit For Tat and Random Starts by cooperation, repeats opponent's last choice skewed by random setting Y
Friendly Pavlov Starts by cooperation, if won in last round does not change, if lost it switches the strategy N
Remorseful Prober Repeats opponent's last choice, but sometimes probes by defecting instead of co-operating. If the opponent defects in response to probing, shows remorse by co-operating once. N
Naive Peace Maker Repeats opponent's last choice, but sometimes make peace by co-operating instead of defecting. Y
Random Always set at 50% probability Y
Always Defect N
Always Co-operate N
Grudger Co-operate until the opponent defects. Then always defect unforgivingly. N
Adaptive Starts with c,c,c,c,c,c,d,d,d,d,d and then takes choices which have given the best average score re-calculated after every move N
Gradual Co-operates until the opponent defects, in such case defects the total number of times the opponent has defected during the game. Followed up by two co-operations. N

 


Examples
 

 

Example 1:

 

Example 2:

 


Quotes